Fully homomorphic encryption (FHE) is a form of public-key encryption that enables arbitrary computation over encrypted data. The past few years have seen several realizations of FHE under different assumptions, and FHE has been used as a building block in many cryptographic applications.
Introduction

Fully Homomorphic Encryption
key pair (pk, sk) for an FHE scheme and send pk, Enc pk (x) to the other party. This second party can then compute an encryption of the desired result f (x, y) and send the resulting ciphertext back to the first party. Finally, the first party can decrypt this ciphertext to recover f (x, y); it then sends this result to the second party (assuming the second party should also learn the result).
It turns out that FHE with the functionality described above can be realized trivially by the construction in which we simply define f, Enc pk (m 1 ), . . . , Enc pk (m ) to be a valid encryption of f (m 1 , . . . , m ). This notion, however, does not suffice for most proposed applications of FHE (in particular, it does not suffice for the one above). Thus, some "non-triviality" requirement must be added to the definition of FHE in order to make the notion meaningful. Various such requirements can be considered. We consider two requirements here: (1) compactness, which requires that ciphertexts have bounded length, and (2) circuit privacy, which requires that the encryption of f (m 1 , . . . , m ) should not reveal f . Note that the trivial scheme described earlier does not satisfy either of these conditions.
Because of its many applications, FHE has long been a "holy grail" in cryptography [RAD78] . It is only in the past few years, however, that candidate FHE schemes have been proposed. The first scheme was constructed by Gentry [Gen09a] , and his work inspired a tremendous amount of research showing efficiency improvements to his scheme (e.g., [SS10] ), realizations of FHE based on different assumptions (e.g., [vDGHV10, BV11b, BV11a, BGV12, Bra12] ), implementations of FHE (e.g., [SV10, GH11] ), and new applications of FHE (e.g., [GGP10, CKV10] ). We omit further details since they are not directly relevant to our work.
Adaptive Security
In a separate line of work, the notion of adaptive security was proposed for (standard) publickey encryption schemes by Canetti et al. [CFGN96] . Their motivation was to guarantee security when encryption schemes are used to encrypt messages sent during an interactive protocol, and parties running the protocol can be adaptively corrupted during the course of the entire protocol execution [BH92] and, in particular, the adversary can determine which parties to corrupt based on what messages have been sent in the protocol thus far. (The adaptive-corruption model stands in contrast to the static-corruption model where the attacker is assumed to corrupt parties only before the protocol begins.) The adaptive-corruption model is realistic in many environments where protocols may be run, and so it is clearly desirable to achieve this level of security; moreover, it is easy to show protocols secure in the static-corruption model that are demonstrably insecure against adaptive corruptions.
The primary challenge with regard to adaptively secure encryption is that the protocol simulator (used to prove security of the protocol) must simulate the ciphertexts being sent by the various parties without knowing the underlying plaintext. At some later point in time, however, the adversary may request to corrupt a party, and the simulator must then simulate for the adversary any secret keys held by that party. (The adversary may also corrupt past senders and, if secure erasure is not assumed, the simulator will then have to simulate for the adversary the random tape used by the sender when encrypting. This only makes the problem harder.) These secret keys must be such that they correctly decrypt any ciphertexts previously sent to that party. Most natural public-key encryption schemes will not be suitable here, in particular because a given public key typically has a unique secret key associated with it; this implies that any (correctly generated) ciphertext can be later "opened" to at most one plaintext.
Canetti et al. [CFGN96] show how to construct adaptively secure encryption schemes from general assumptions. Subsequent research (e.g., [Bea97, DN00, JL00, KO04, CHK05, CDSMW09]) has shown more efficient constructions based on specific number-theoretic assumptions, or satisfying weaker (but still meaningful) notions of adaptive security.
Adaptively Secure FHE?
Because of the various applications of FHE to protocol design, it is natural to ask whether adaptive security can be realized for FHE. We show two results in this regard. First, we show that adaptive security is impossible for FHE schemes satisfying compactness. This result is unconditional, and holds even when only the receiver may be corrupted. 1 On the other hand, we show that this notion of adaptive security is possible for FHE schemes satisfying circuit privacy. Our results are interesting in their own right, but also show a separation of sorts between two notions of non-triviality (namely, compactness and circuit privacy) that have been considered in the literature.
We remark that the impossibility result of Nielsen [Nie02] does not apply to our setting. Nielsen shows that unbounded adaptive security is impossible for non-interactive public-key encryption schemes. More precisely, Nielsen shows that if the secret key is t bits long, then it is impossible to achieve adaptive security if t + 1 bits of plaintext are encrypted. Here, however, we are willing to place an a priori upper bound on the length of the plaintext that will be encrypted and allow the secret key to be arbitrarily long (and, in particular, longer than ). This makes sense when encryption is used to encrypt messages sent within an interactive protocol, where the length of the messages to be encrypted is bounded in advance (and a fresh public key can be generated for each independent protocol execution). And, indeed, when the secret key can be longer than the plaintext, adaptive security is possible for standard public-key encryption schemes.
Definitions
Throughout, we let k denote the security parameter.
Fully Homomorphic Encryption
We begin by formally defining the notion of fully homomorphic encryption. (Although it may appear intuitively obvious how fully homomorphic encryption should be defined, the definition turns out to have a number of subtleties as discussed in the Introduction and further below.) Definition 2.1 (Fully homomorphic encryption). Fix a function = (k). An -homomorphic encryption scheme HE for a class of circuits {C k } k∈N consists of four polynomial-time algorithms Gen, Enc, Dec, and Eval such that
• Gen, the key-generation algorithm, is a randomized algorithm that takes the security parameter 1 k as input and outputs a public key pk and secret key sk.
• Enc, the encryption algorithm, is a randomized algorithm that takes a public key pk and a message m ∈ {0, 1} as input, and outputs a ciphertext c.
• Dec, the decryption algorithm, is a deterministic algorithm that takes the secret key sk and a ciphertext c as input, and outputs a message m ∈ {0, 1}.
• Eval, the homomorphic evaluation algorithm, takes as input a public key pk, a circuit C ∈ C k , and a list of ciphertexts 2 c 1 , · · · , c (k) ; it outputs a ciphertext c * .
The following correctness properties are required to hold:
1. For any k, any m ∈ {0, 1}, and any (pk, sk) output by Gen(1 k ), we have m = Dec sk (Enc pk (m)).
2. For any k, any m 1 , . . . , m , and any C ∈ C k , we have
(In fact, we can relax the above and require them to hold with all but negligible probability.)
We use the standard notion of security against chosen-plaintext attacks. (Although stronger notions of security could be considered, the question of adaptive security is tangential to these considerations.) Definition 2.2. A homomorphic encryption scheme is secure against chosen-plaintext attacks (also called CPA-secure) if for any polynomial-time adversary A the following is negligible in k:
where (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ).
As noted earlier, Definitions 2.1 and 2.2 on their own are not enough to capture a meaningful notion of fully homomorphic encryption. This is because they can be satisfied by a "trivial" construction starting from any CPA-secure (standard) public-key encryption scheme Π = (Gen, Enc , Dec ) by defining Enc, Eval, and Dec as follows:
• Enc pk (m) = (0, Enc pk (m)).
• Eval pk (C, c 1 , . . . , c ) outputs (1, C, c 1 , . . . , c ).
• Dec sk (c) does as follows: if c = (0, c ), then output Dec sk (c ) (i.e., decrypt as in Π). If c = (1, C, c 1 , . . . , c ), then output
(i.e., decrypt and then apply C to the results).
There are various ways one could imagine ruling out trivial schemes like the above. The first approach we consider (following previous work in the literature) is to require that ciphertexts cannot grow arbitrarily large; this is known as compactness.
Definition 2.3 (Compactness). An -homomorphic encryption scheme HE for a class of circuits {C k } k∈N is compact if there exists a polynomial α = α(k) such that ciphertexts output by Eval have length at most α. (For this to be non-trivial it should be the case that, for all k, we have α(k) ≤ |C| for some C ∈ C k .)
We say an -homomorphic encryption scheme is -fully homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all boolean circuits, CPA-secure, and compact.
An alternate non-triviality condition that has been considered is to require that the output of Eval pk (C, c 1 , . . . , c ) should reveal nothing about C, even to the holder of the secret key sk. This notion is called circuit privacy. There are different ways of formalizing such a notion. The definition we use is slightly weaker than some others that have been considered previously, since we allow (an upper bound on) the size of C to be revealed. A similar notion was considered in [GHV10] .
Definition 2.4 (Circuit privacy). An -homomorphic encryption scheme HE for a class of circuits {C k } k∈N is circuit private if there exists an efficient simulator S such that for every (pk, sk) generated by Gen, every C ∈ C k , and every m 1 , . . . , m , the following two distributions are computationally indistinguishable (even given pk, sk, C, m 1 , . . . , m ):
We say an -homomorphic encryption scheme is circuit-private homomorphic if it is homomorphic for all boolean circuits, CPA-secure, and circuit private according to Definition 2.4.
Adaptively Secure Fully Homomorphic Encryption
We consider here a notion of adaptive security for FHE that is weaker than the notion considered by Canetti et al. [CFGN96] . Specifically, we consider only adaptive corruption of the receiver. (Alternately, we assume secure erasure and thus the sender can erase the randomness it uses for encryption immediately after encryption is complete.) Here, a simulator is required to produce (a bounded number of) simulated ciphertexts c 1 , . . . , c that it gives to an adversary; the adversary then outputs messages m 1 , . . . , m ∈ {0, 1}, and the simulator should give the adversary a (single) key sk that "explains" (i.e., decrypts) each ciphertext c i as m i .
We stress here that we only require adaptive security where there is an a priori upper bound on the number of encryptions. (This suffices for applications where encryption is used as part of an interactive protocol.) Thus, Nielsen's impossibility result [Nie02] does not apply to our setting. Definition 2.5 (Adaptively secure FHE). An -homomorphic encryption scheme HE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) is adaptively secure if there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time algorithm S = (S 1 , S 2 ) such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we have
where:
Impossibility Result
In this section, we show that adaptively secure -fully homomorphic encryption is impossible. We first give some intuition behind this result. Say adaptively secure FHE were possible. This implies the existence of a simulator as required by Definition 2.5. This then gives an alternate way of computing any function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} (described by a circuit C f ), in the following way:
1. Run S 1 to obtain pk, c 1 , . . . , c , and state s.
3. Given input x ∈ {0, 1} , run S 2 (s, x 1 , . . . , x ) to obtain a secret key sk.
Compute Dec sk (c ) to obtain f (x).
Note that steps 1 and 2 can be computed in advance of receiving the input x. Thus, we can hardcode s, c , and randomness (if any) for S 2 into a circuit that, upon receiving input x = (x 1 , . . . , x ), computes sk = S 2 (s, x) and then outputs Dec sk (c ). Adaptive security implies that this output must be correct for most inputs x. (More precisely, it guarantees that there exist values of s, c , and randomness for S 2 for which the circuit is correct for most inputs x.) But because Dec and S 2 are algorithms of some fixed complexity, and c is of some bounded size (here is where we use the compactness property), we have some polynomial upper-bound t on the size of the circuit that we get above. Taking f to be a function that cannot be approximated by circuits of size t, but that can be computed in polynomial size T t, we arrive at a contradiction. We now formalize this result.
Theorem 3.1 (Main Result). Let = ω(log k). Then, adaptively secure fully -homomorphic encryption does not exist.
Proof. Assume, toward a contradiction, that such a scheme HE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval) exists. This implies the existence of a non-uniform family of circuits S = (S 1 , S 2 ) satisfying Definition 2.5. Let t(k) denote an upper bound on the size of the circuit for S 2 plus the size of a circuit computing Dec for any ciphertext c output by Eval. Using compactness (which says that the size of any such c is bounded by some fixed polynomial) and the fact that Dec runs in polynomial time, we see that
For a given function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} that can be computed by a polynomial-size circuit C f , we will define a circuit C * s,c ,ω . Construction of this circuit proceeds in the following way. First, run S 1 to obtain pk, c 1 , . . . , c , and state s. Then compute c ← Eval pk (C f , c 1 , . . . , c ). Choose random coins ω for S 2 . Then define C * s,c ,ω as follows:
• On input x ∈ {0, 1} , run S 2 (s, x 1 , . . . , x ) (using random coins ω) to obtain sk. Then output Dec sk (c ).
We stress that s, c , and ω are hard-coded into the above circuit. Thus, the size of C * s,c ,ω is at most t(k).
Given a circuit C : {0, 1} → {0, 1} and a function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1}, we say that C is an
The theorem follows from the next two lemmas.
Lemma 3.2. There exist s, c , ω such that the circuit C * s,c ,ω constructed above is a 3/4-approximation of f .
Proof. Consider the following non-uniform, polynomial-size adversary A = (A 1 , A 2 ): adversary A 1 outputs random x 1 , . . . , x ∈ {0, 1}. Then, on input pk, c 1 , . . . , c and sk, adversary A 2 computes c ← Eval pk (C f , c 1 , . . . , c ) followed by y = Dec sk (c ). (Non-uniformity is used to hard-wire into A 2 a description of the circuit C f .) Finally, A 2 outputs 1 if and only if y = f (x 1 , . . . , x ).
Correctness of the FHE scheme implies that in Real A (k) the adversary outputs 1 with all but negligible probability. Adaptive security (Definition 2.5) thus implies that the adversary outputs 1 with all but negligible probability in Ideal A (k). But this means that
where x ∈ {0, 1} is chosen uniformly and s, c , ω are generated as in the construction of C * s,c ,ω described earlier. But this means that there exist s, c , ω for which
where the probability is now only over the uniform choice of x ∈ {0, 1} . This circuit C * s,c ,ω is thus a 3/4-approximation of f .
The contradiction is given by the fact that there exist functions f that can be computed by circuits of polynomial size T but cannot be 3/4-approximated by circuits of size t.
Lemma 3.3. For any t(k) = poly(k) and (k) = ω(log k), there exists a function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} that can be computed by a circuit of size T (k), where 2 / > T (k) > , but which cannot be 3/4-approximated by any circuit of size t(k).
Proof. A proof follows via suitable modification of the proof of the standard hierarchy theorem for non-uniform computation [AB09] . Pick a random function f , and consider the probability that a fixed circuit C of size S correctly computes f on at least 3/4 of its inputs. Using Chernoff bounds, we can show that this probability is at most e −2 /16 . Since there are at most 2 2S log S+5S circuits of size S, we have that if S = 2 /2 /16 (and hence 2S log S + 5S < 2 /16), then there exists a function that is hard to 3/4-approximate for all circuits of size S.
Every function f : {0, 1} → {0, 1} is computable by a 2 10 sized circuit. If we set = 2.2 log k and let g : {0, 1} k → {0, 1} be the function that applies f on the first bits of its input, then g can be computed by a circuit of size O(k 3 ), but cannot be 3/4-approximated by circuits of size k.
This concludes the proof of the theorem. Thus, for = ω(log k), adaptively secure fullyhomomorphic encryption does not exist.
Feasibility Result
In this section, we show that adaptive security is possible for circuit-private adaptively secure fully homomorphic encryption (i.e., not requiring the compactness property but satisfying correctness, adaptive security, and circuit privacy). The main idea is similar to the construction in [Gen09b, GHV10, BHHI10] but with adaptively secure building blocks. Specifically, our construction is based on (i) a two-move semi-honest oblivious transfer (OT) protocol with receiver adaptive security, in combination with (ii) a projective garbling scheme leaking only the circuit size [Yao86, BHR12] , and (iii) multiple-message, receiver-non-committing public-key encryption (which is a stronger version of single-message receiver-non-committing encryption introduced in [JL00] ). Next, we first recall the high-level idea of [Gen09b, GHV10, BHHI10] , and then explain how to upgrade the building blocks to achieve our goal.
Oblivious transfer is a cryptographic task carried out between a sender and a receiver, which allows the receiver to obtain one of two values from the sender. The receiver learns only the value he received and nothing about the other value. The sender is oblivious to which value was received by the receiver. Typically, a two-move OT protocol consists of the following steps:
• the receiver based on his input m ∈ {0, 1} generates an OT query (msg, w) ← OT1(m), where msg is the first-move message, and w is some state used later; the receiver gives msg to the sender;
• then, the sender, based on her input strings (x 0 , x 1 ), generates an OT response ( msg, ζ) ← OT2(x 0 , x 1 , msg), where msg is the second-move message, ζ is the internal state used by the sender; the sender gives msg to the receiver;
• finally, based on previously stored state w and the second-move message msg obtained from the sender, the receiver computes the OT output x m ← OT3(w, msg).
Interestingly, based on OT, as suggested in [Gen09b, GHV10, BHHI10], we can construct a circuit-private homomorphic scheme, including key generation, encryption, decryption, and evaluation algorithms, as follows: In key generation, we can run the key generation of a regular public-key encryption scheme to produce a key-pair (pk , sk ). The encryption is slightly more complicated, consisting of two steps; to encrypt plaintext m ∈ {0, 1} , we first run msg i ← OT1(m i ; w i ) for all i ∈ [ ]; in order to allow the secret key holder to decrypt, we then include encryption of w i in the ciphertext based on the public key pk , and let c i = (msg i , Enc pk (w i )) denote the ciphertext for the i-th input bit; the final encryption for m is c = (c 1 , . . . , c ). The evaluation algorithm Eval(pk , C, c 1 , . . . , c ) is based on Yao's garbling technique [Yao86] ; we first construct a garbled circuitĈ of circuit C; then we use the OT queries {msg i } i∈[ ] as well as the encoding of the input wires inĈ to construct OT responses { msg i } i∈[ ] ; we finally setĉ i := ( msg i , Enc pk (w i )) and output (Ĉ,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ) as the ciphertext of the evaluation algorithm. In decryption stage, if the received ciphertext is produced by the evaluation algorithm, i.e., in the form of (Ĉ,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ), we can first recover w i by using sk , and obtain the input keys from the OT responses msg 1 , . . . , msg ; then we use such input keys to evaluate the garbled circuitĈ to obtain the output. (If the received ciphertext is generated by the encryption algorithm, i.e., c i = (msg i , e i ), we can first recover w i by using sk , and then recover the encrypted bit m i from msg i and w i .)
To achieve adaptive security, we need to update the building blocks with adaptive security. Semi-honest two-move OT protocol will suffice in the above construction; but to achieve adaptive security of the circuit-private homomorphic encryption, we need semi-honest two-move OT but with adaptive receiver security. Fortunately, the semi-honest OT protocol in [CLOS02] is sufficient for our goal. We also need to replace the regular public key encryption with a multi-message receiver non-commiting encryption (formal definition can be found below). We note that this new notion can be viewed as a strengthened version of receiver non-committing encryption introduced in [JL00] ; see [CHK05] for more constructions. Currently, we are not aware as to how such a notion can be achieved in the standard model. Instead, we present a construction in the random oracle (RO) model.
Before describing our construction, we recall the definitions of garbling schemes, semi-honest OT with adaptive receiver security, and then define the multi-message receiver non-committing encryption. Then, we present our construction of a circuit-private homomorphic scheme which achieves correctness, adaptive security, and circuit privacy, but not compactness.
Building Blocks
Garbling Schemes
Here, we define garbling schemes and introduce the security notion we consider for such schemes in this work. The content here follows the recent work by Bellare, Hoang and Rogaway [BHR12] . For a detailed description of the material presented here, we refer the reader to the original paper [BHR12] .
A garbling scheme is a five tuple of algorithms G = (Gb, En, De, Ev, ev). A string f , the original function, describes the function ev(f, .) : {0, 1} → {0, 1} n that we want to garble. On input f and a security parameter k, the probabilistic algorithm Gb returns a triple of strings (F, e, d) ← Gb(1 k , f ). String e describes an encoding function, En(e, .), that maps an initial input m ∈ {0, 1} to a garbled input X = En(e, m). String F describes a garbled function ev(F, .), that maps each garbled input X to a garbled output Y = ev(F, X). We consider only projective garbling schemes in this work. A projective garbling scheme as described in [BHR12] is one where e encodes a list of tokens, one pair for each bit in m ∈ {0, 1} . Encoding function En(e, .) uses the bits of m = m 1 · · · m to select from e = X 0 1 , X 1 1 , · · · , X 0 , X 1 the subvector X = (X For the privacy notion considered, we allow that certain information about the function f can be revealed and this is captured by the side information function Φ(f ). Specifically, for this work, the side information function that we allow our garbling scheme to reveal is the size of the circuit.
For the security notion, we describe only the simulation-based notion of privacy in [BHR12] . We note that there are other notions and formulations of security for garbling schemes considered there which could be of interest for later work. We present the definition of the simulation-based security notion of privacy of a garbling scheme.
Definition 4.1. Consider the following game PrvSim G,Φ,S associated with a garbling scheme G, side information function Φ(f ) and a simulator S. The adversary A is run on input 1 k and makes exactly one Garble query. The Garble procedure is described as follows.
The adversary after getting the answer to the query must output a bit b . The adversary's advantage is given by:
The protocol G is secure over Φ if for every polynomial-time adversary A there is a polynomialtime simulator S such that Adv
Semi-Honest Oblivious Transfer with Adaptive Receiver Security
1-out-of-2 Oblivious Transfer (OT) allows a receiver to obtain exactly one of two messages from a sender where the receiver remains oblivious to the other message, and the sender is oblivious to which value was received. Please refer to Figure 1 for 2-move OT. We next define secure 2-move OT scheme with adaptive receiver security.
Definition 4.2 (Secure 2-move OT with Adaptive Receiver Security). A k-bit 2-move string oblivious transfer scheme OT = (OT1, OT2, OT3, OT4) is secure with adaptive receiver security if the following properties hold:
Correctness. The scheme is correct if for all m ∈ {0, 1}, and x 0 , x 1 ∈ {0, 1} k , the following hold
Adaptive Receiver Security. The scheme satisfies adaptive receiver security if there exists a non-uniform, polynomial-time algorithm S recv = (S recv 1 , S recv 2 ) such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we have
Sender Security. The scheme satisfies sender security if there exists a non-uniform, polynomialtime algorithm S send such that for all non-uniform, polynomial-time algorithms
We note that adaptively secure semi-honest OT in [CLOS02] satisfies the above properties.
Multi-Message, Receiver-Non-Committing Public-Key Encryption
Receiver non-committing encryption (RNCE) was introduced in [JL00] and further studied in [CHK05] .
Here, we strengthen their notion to deal with multiple messages with an a priori bound α = poly(k) on the number of messages; we call this α-message RNCE, and formally define it below.
• The randomized key-generation algorithm gen takes as input the security parameter and outputs a key-pair. This is denoted by: (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ). The public key pk defines the message space M.
• The randomized encryption algorithm enc takes a public key pk and a message m ∈ M. It returns a ciphertext c ← enc pk (m).
• The decryption algorithm dec takes as input a secret key sk and a ciphertext c, and returns a message m ← dec sk (c), where m ∈ M ∪ ⊥.
• The randomized key-faking algorithm gen takes as input the security parameter and outputs a public key as well as some auxiliary information. This is denoted by: (pk, z) ← gen(1 k ).
• The fake encryption algorithm enc takes as input a tuple (pk, z) as output by gen, and outputs a tuple of fake ciphertexts and some auxiliary information: (c 1 , . . . , c α , z ) ← enc(pk, z).
• The reveal algorithm rev takes as input a tuple (c 1 , . . . , c α , z ) as output by enc, and a tuple of messages m 1 , . . . , m α ∈ M. It outputs a fake secret key sk ← rev(z , c 1 , . . . , c α , m 1 , . . . , m α ).
(Intuitively, sk is a valid-looking secret key for which c i decrypts to m i for all i ∈ [α].) Definition 4.3 (α-Message Receiver Non-Committing Security). We say that (gen, enc, dec) is a secure receiver non-committing encryption scheme for bounded α = poly(k), if there exist nonuniform, polynomial-time algorithms S = ( gen, enc, rev) such that for all non-uniform, polynomialtime algorithms A = (A 1 , A 2 ) we have
where: τ, pk, c 1 , . . . , c α , m 1 , . . . , m α ) ; Return b.
It is not clear how to construct a scheme to satisfy the above multiple message receiver noncommitting property in the standard model (even assuming that honest entity is allowed to securely erase unnecessary internal state). Following the idea of [BR93, Nie02] , here we give a random oracle based construction (gen, enc, dec) which satisfies α-message receiver non-committing security defined above.
• The randomized key-generation algorithm: (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ):
Generate trapdoor permutation G with inverse G −1 , as well as a hash function H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k ; set pk := (G, H) and sk := G −1 .
• The randomized encryption algorithm c ← enc pk (m):
Upon receiving m ∈ {0, 1} k , choose r at random from the domain of G and compute c 1 ← G(r) and c 2 ← H(r) ⊕ m. Set c := (c 1 , c 2 ).
• The decryption algorithm m ← dec sk (c):
Upon receiving c, parse c = (c 1 , c 2 ); then compute r ← G −1 (c 1 ), m ← H(r) ⊕ c 2 .
• The randomized key-faking algorithm (pk, z) ← gen(1 k ):
Generate trapdoor permutation G with inverse G −1 ; let H : {0, 1} * → {0, 1} k be the random oracle; set pk := (G, H) and z := G −1 .
• The fake encryption algorithm (c 1 , . . . , c α , z ) ← enc(pk, z):
, choose r i at random from the domain of G, compute c 1 i ← G(r i ), and choose c 2 i ← {0, 1} k at random, set c i := (c 1 i , c 2 i ). Set z := (pk, z, {r i } i∈ [α] ).
• The reveal algorithm sk ← rev(z , c 1 , . . . , c α , m 1 , . . . , m α ): 
Adaptively Secure Circuit-Private -Homomorphic Encryption
Our construction is based on (i) projective garbling scheme (Gb, En, De, Ev, ev), leaking only the circuit size [Yao86, LP09, BHR12], (ii) receiver adaptively secure semi-honest OT protocol (OT1, OT2, OT3, OT4), and (iii) -message receiver non-committing public-key encryption (gen, enc, dec). Next we present the construction of a circuit-private -homomorphic encryption HE = (Gen, Enc, Dec, Eval).
• The key-generation algorithm (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ):
Compute (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk and sk := sk.
• The encryption algorithm c ← Enc pk (m):
Upon input m ∈ {0, 1}, compute (msg, w) ← OT1(m), and then compute e ← enc pk (w). Set c := (msg, e).
• The decryption algorithm m ← Dec sk (c):
-Upon input ciphertext c, parse c. If it parses into (msg, e), then compute w ← dec sk (e), and compute m ← OT4(msg, w).
• The evaluation algorithm c * ← Eval(pk , C, c 1 , . . . , c ):
-Using the projective garbling scheme, on input C, let Gb(1 k , C) → (Ĉ, e, d). Parse the encoding function represented by string e as (X 0 1 , X 1 1 , . . . , X 0 , X 1 ).
, and set
Theorem 4.4. Construction HE presented above is an adaptively secure circuit-private -homomorphic encryption.
Proof. We show below that the construction HE is a secure -homomorphic encryption that satisfies correctness, circuit privacy, and adaptive security.
Correctness. It is easy to verify the correctness. To compute Dec sk (c) for c = Enc pk (m) where c = (msg, e) and e = enc pk (w), we first compute w ← dec sk (e), and then compute m ← OT4(msg, w ). Given the fact that (gen, enc, dec) is correct, it holds that w = dec sk (enc pk (w)), i.e., w = w ; furthermore, given the fact that the OT scheme is correct, it holds that m = OT4(OT1(m)), i.e., m = m . Therefore, we have Dec sk (c) = m for c = Enc pk (m).
To compute Dec sk (c) for c = Eval(pk , C, c 1 , . . . , c ), where c = (Ĉ, d,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ), parseĉ i aŝ c i = ( msg i , e i ) for all i ∈ [ ]. We first compute w i ← dec sk (e i ),X i ← OT3(w i , msg i ). Then we use the input key strings X = (X 1 , . . . ,X ) to evaluate the garbled circuitĈ as Ev(Ĉ, X) and obtain C(m 1 , . . . ,m ). Given the fact that (gen, enc, dec) is correct, we have w i = w i ; furthermore, given the fact that the OT is correct,X i = X m i i ; also, given the fact that the garbling scheme is correct, we have C(m 1 , . . . , m ) = De(d, Ev(Ĉ, X)). Therefore, we have Dec sk (c) = m for c = Eval(pk , C, c 1 , . . . , c ) and m = C(m 1 , . . . , m ).
Circuit privacy. The property of circuit privacy follows from the security of the garbling scheme and the sender security of the OT. By the security of the garbling scheme, we have that there exists a simulator S G on input the security parameter, output of the function and the side information function Φ outputs (F, X, d) except with negligible probability. As mentioned before, Φ(C) = |C| in our construction.
Let us construct a simulator S as follows:
• Upon receiving (1 k , pk , |C|, C(m 1 , . . . , m ), c 1 , . . . , c ) where c i = Enc pk (m i ) for i ∈ [ ], the simulator S runs the simulator S G of the garbling scheme to obtain (F, X, d) ← S G (1 k , C(m 1 , . . . , m ), |C|).
• SetĈ = F . Parse X as (X 1 , . . . ,X ).
• To compute the ciphertextĉ i , parse c i into (msg i , e i ) as in the construction. Then compute msg i ← S send (1 k , msg i ,X i ) using the OT-simulator for sender security, and setĉ i := ( msg i , e i ), for all i ∈ [ ].
• Finally, set c * := (Ĉ, d,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ).
Next, we develop a sequence of hybrids to show that Definition 2.4 is satisfied.
Hybrid H 0 : As in the real scheme, we run the evaluation algorithm Eval to compute c * , i.e, c * ← Eval(pk , C, c 1 , . . . , c ) where c * = (Ĉ, d,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ). Concretely, we use the projective garbling scheme, on input C, compute (Ĉ, e, d) ← Gb(1 k , C); then we parse the encoding function represented by string e as (X 0 1 , X 1 1 , . . . , X 0 , X 1 ), and parse c i into (msg i , e i ) for i ∈ [ ]; after that, we compute msg i ← OT2(X 0 i , X 1 i , msg i ), and setĉ i := ( msg i , e i ), for all i ∈ [ ]; finally, set c * := (Ĉ, d,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ). The adversary A is given c * as well as the input m, circuit C and the secret key sk.
Hybrid H 1,j : For j ∈ [0 . . . ], the hybrid H 1,j is the same as the Hybrid H 0 except the following:
, using the OT simulator for sender security and setĉ i := ( msg i , e i ).
We argue that for j ∈ [0, . . . , − 1], the hybrids H 1,j and H 1,j+1 are computationally indistinguishable under the assumption that the OT satisfies sender security. If there is an adversary A who can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, then we can construct an adversary B who breaks the sender security of the OT as follows.
The adversary B acts as follows:
• run (pk , sk ) ← Gen(1 k ), i.e., run (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk, sk := sk.
• Choose m = (m 1 , . . . , m ). For all i ∈ [1, . . . , ], compute c i ← Enc pk (m i ), i.e., compute (msg i , w i ) ← OT1(m i ), and e i ← enc pk (w i ), and set c i := (msg i , e i );
• Using the projective garbling scheme on a circuit C, let Gb(1 k , C) → (Ĉ, e, d). Parse the encoding function represented by string e as (X 0 1 , X 1 1 , . . . , X 0 , X 1 ); • for all i ∈ [1, . . . , j−1], parse c i into (msg i , e i ). Then compute msg i ← OT2(X 0 i , X 1 i , msg i ), and setĉ i := ( msg i , e i );
Then parse c i into (msg i , e i ) and obtain msg i , where it is either generated by S send , i.e., msg i ← S send (1 k , msg i , X m i i ), or generated by the OT scheme honestly, i.e.,
• Return (m, sk , pk , C,Ĉ, d,ĉ 1 , . . . ,ĉ ) to the internally simulated A.
When i = j, if msg i obtained by B is generated by S send , then A interacts with Hybrid H 1,j+1 . Otherwise, if msg i is generated by the OT scheme honestly, then A interacts with Hybrid H 1,j . Based on the assumption that A can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, we can conclude that B can distinguish Ideal from Real as in Definition 4.2 for sender security. This contradicts our assumption that the OT is sender-secure. Therefore, Hybrid H 1,j+1 and Hybrid H 1,j are indistinguishable.
Note that H 0 is identical to H 1,0 . Since Hybrids H 1,j+1 and H 1,j are indistinguishable as argued above, we also have that Hybrid H 0 is computationally indistinguishable from Hybrid H 1, .
Hybrid H 2 : This is the same as Hybrid H 1, except the following:
We run the simulator S G for the projective garbling scheme to obtain the garbled circuit, input and the decoding function, i.e., (F, X, d) ← S G (1 k , C(m 1 , . . . , m ) , |C|). Parse X as (X 1 , . . . ,X ), and setĈ = F .
We note that this is exactly the output produced by the simulator S for circuit privacy.
The hybrids H 1, and H 2 are indistinguishable under the assumption that G is a secure garbling scheme. If there is an adversary A who can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, then we can construct an adversary B who breaks the security of the garbling scheme as defined in Definition 4.1.
Consider an adversary B who acts as follows:
• Choose a circuit C. Make a Garble query on (C, m) to obtain the challenge (F, X, d). SetĈ = F .
• Parse X as (X 1 , . . . ,X ). For all i ∈ [ ], parse c i into (msg i , e i ), and compute msg i ← S send (1 k , msg i ,X i ); Setĉ i = ( msg i , e i );
When B's challenge (F, X, d) is generated honestly, then the internally simulated A interacts with H 1, . On the other hand, when B's challenge is generated by S G , the simulated A interacts with H 2 . Based on the assumption that A can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, we can conclude that B can gain a non-negligible advantage as in Definition 4.1. However, this is a contradiction to our assumption that G is a secure garbling scheme. Therefore, Hybrid H 1, and Hybrid H 2 are indistinguishable.
Thus, we have that the hybrids H 0 and H 2 are indistinguishable which implies that the scheme satisfies the circuit privacy requirement as defined in Definition 2.4.
Adaptive security. Next we give the proof idea for proving the adaptive security as defined in Definition 2.5. We construct the simulator S = (S 1 , S 2 ) as follows. The simulator is based on the algorithms ( gen, enc, rev) of the RNCE scheme, and the simulator (S recv 1 , S recv 2 ) of the OT scheme.
• (pk , c 1 , . . . , c , s) ← S 1 (1 k ):
Compute (pk, z) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk. Compute (e 1 , . . . , e , z ) ← enc(pk, z).
(1 k ), and set c i := (msg i , e i ).
Store all information into state s.
• sk ← S 2 (s, m 1 , . . . , m ):
Upon obtaining (m 1 , . . . , m ), recover {γ i } i∈[ ] from the state s.
Compute sk ← rev(z , {e i , w i } i∈[ ] ), and set sk := sk.
Next, we develop a sequence of hybrids to show that the real experiment defined in Definition 2.5 is indistinguishable from the ideal experiment.
Hybrid H 0 : This is the real experiment.
When the adversary A outputs (m 1 , . . . , m ), compute (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk, sk := sk. Then for all i ∈ [ ], do the following: compute (msg i , w i ) ← OT1(m i ), e i ← enc pk (w i ), and set c i := (msg i , e i ). Return (pk , c 1 , . . . , c , sk ) to the adversary.
Hybrid H 1,j : Here j ∈ [0, . . . , ]. The hybrid is the same as the Hybrid H 0 except the following:
We argue that for j ∈ [0, . . . , − 1], the hybrids H 1,j and H 1,j+1 are computationally indistinguishable under the assumption that the OT satisfies adaptive receiver security. Assume there is an adversary A who can distinguish between the two hybrids. For all S recv , we next show how to construct B to distinguish between the Real experiment from the Ideal experiment as in Definition 4.2.
B internally simulates A and receives (m 1 , . . . , m ) from it. Then B carries out the following:
• run (pk, sk) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk, sk := sk;
• for all i ∈ [1, . . . , j − 1], compute (msg i , w i ) ← OT1(m i ), e i ← enc pk (w i );
• for i = j, obtain the pair (msg i , w i ), where the pair is generated by either S recv = (S recv 1 , S recv 2 ), i.e., (msg i , γ i ) ← S recv 1
(1 k ) and w i ← S recv 2 (msg i , γ i , m i ), or generated by the OT scheme honestly, i.e., (msg i , w i ) ← OT1(m i );
• for all i ∈ [j + 1, ], run (msg i , γ i ) ← S recv 1 (1 k ) and w i ← S recv 2 (msg i , γ i , m i );
• for all i ∈ [ ], set c i := (msg i , e i );
• Return (pk , c 1 , . . . , c , sk ) to the internally simulated A.
Note that when i = j, if the pair (msg i , w i ) that B obtains are generated by S recv = (S recv 1 , S recv 2 ), then A interacts with Hybrid H 1,j+1 , while if the pair (msg i , w i ) that B obtains are generated by the OT scheme honestly, A interacts with Hybrid H 1,j . Based on the assumption that A can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, we can conclude that B can distinguish Ideal from Real as in Definition 4.2 for defining adaptive receiver security. This leads to a contradiction to our assumption that the OT has adaptive receiver security. Therefore, Hybrid H 1,j+1 and Hybrid H 1,j are indistinguishable.
Note that H 0 is identical to H 1,0 . Since Hybrid H 1,j+1 and Hybrid H 1,j are indistinguishable, as argued above, we also have that H 0 are computationally indistinguishable from H 1, .
Hybrid H 2 : The hybrid is the same as Hybrid H 1, except the following:
Compute (pk, z) ← gen(1 k ), and set pk := pk. Compute (e 1 , . . . , e , z ) ← enc(pk, z). Compute sk ← rev(z , {e i , w i } i∈[ ] ), and set sk := sk. We note that this is exactly the ideal experiment.
We argue that H 1, and H 2 are computationally indistinguishable under the -message RNC security. Assume there is an adversary A who can distinguish between the two hybrids. We next show how to construct a machine B to win the -message RNC security game.
B receives pk, and internally runs A. Upon receiving (m 1 , . . . , m ) from A, B computes (msg i , w i ) ← OT1(m i ) for all i ∈ [ ], and outputs (w 1 , . . . , w i ) to its challenger. Upon receiving from its challenger (e 1 , . . . , e , sk), B defines c i := (msg i , e i ) for all i ∈ [ ], and returns (pk , c 1 , . . . , c , sk ) to A. B returns A's output as its own output. When B's received tuple (pk, e 1 , . . . , e , sk) is generated by (gen, enc, dec) honestly, then the internally simulated A interacts with H 1, . On the other hand, when B's received tuple (pk, e 1 , . . . , e , sk) is generated by ( gen, enc, rev), i.e, (pk, z) ← gen(1 k ), (e 1 , . . . , e , z ) ← enc(pk, z), and sk ← rev(z , {e i , w i } i∈[ ] ), the simulated A interacts with H 2 . Based on the assumption that A can distinguish between the two hybrids with non-negligible probability, we can conclude that B can distinguish Ideal from Real as in Definition 4.3. This leads to a contradiction. Therefore, Hybrids H 1, and H 2 are indistinguishable.
Based on the above argument we have H 0 and H 1, are indistinguishable, and H 1, and H 2 are indistinguishable. Therefore H 0 and H 2 are indistinguishable. Note that Hybrid H 2 is exactly the ideal experiment, and H 0 is the real experiment. We now have that the ideal and the real experiments are indistinguishable. This implies that the scheme satisfies adaptive security.
